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DO EUROPEAN UNION NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
CREATE ECONOMIC NUISANCES IN
THE UNITED STATES?
Thomas P. Redick & Michaelj Adrian*
ABSTRACT
The European Union's new traceability system for biotech crops will lead
to the proliferation of non-tariff barriers affecting biotech crops. This, in
turn, will lead to economic dislocation and attendant liability in the United
States, which is losing billions of dollars in export trade. A chain of complex
legal problems will arise for United States-based companies as they strive to
trace particular genetically modified (GM) events and avoid commingling.
The European Union (E. U) tracing law for biotech crops applies at each
stage of commodity commerce, from grain shippers leading back through ele-
vators, growers, and seed companies. Warranty liability could arise from
denial of entry in the ports of the E. U, and any trading partners following a
similar "zero tolerance" approach (e.g., China, New Zealand, Japan, etc.) as
shippers denied entry use the E. U-imposed tracing system to trace unap-
proved-in-E. U, biotech crops back to growers or biotech seed companies. Nui-
sance liability could arise as growers look to their neighbors for the source of
their warranty violation. E. U-mandated documentation will expedite the
process of establishing liability for commingling of the variety of biotech crop.
Given the economic impact that the E. U, 's zero tolerance could have
upon grain trading and agricultural innovation in the United States, and
the legal claims arising from such an impact, United States agribusiness
needs legal mechanisms to prevent liability (or allocate it fairly) for those
impacted at every stage in the chain of commerce. Without such prevention,
growers, seed companies, and grain buyers could become embroiled in claims
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against one another (i.e., common law claims of warranty, nuisance, tres-
pass, etc.). To prevent liability, businesses need legal tools that could help
prevent economic loss and liability claims. These tools include grower or
stewardship agreements, grower districts, and industry stewardship (stan-
dards for identity preservation).1
To reverse E. U. tracing policy and the proliferation of these trade barri-
ers, the United States may need to maintain a "biosafety body count" that
measures the human health and ecological impact of E. U. tracing policy. If
scientific analysis shows a genuine benefit from biotech crops for human
health or the environment, then both regulatory law and products liability
law will dictate the increased use of the "best available" technology-biotech
crops-as a tool for environmental conservation and avoiding products lia-
bility claims arising from impacts to health.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 2004, the E.U.'s Directives on Traceability and La-
beling went into effect.2 The laws apply at "each stage" of commodity
commerce, from grain shippers leading back through elevators, grow-
ers, and seed companies. The practical effect of the E.U. laws is to
impose a "zero tolerance" standard for biotech crops that have not
received regulatory approval from the E.U., and the Traceability &
Labeling ("T & L") Directives will lead to genetic testing of shipments
of United States commodities exports. The E.U. is showing signs of an
intent to use genetic tests to trace every kernel, bean, or cottonseed
that contains the wrong genes (those lacking regulatory approval in
the E.U.), using a "zero tolerance" standard. Even approved biotech
crops will be subject to labels, with a 0.9 percent tolerance that will be
difficult to meet in United States production without high costs.
1. "Identity Preservation" is a term for growing crops in a manner that ensures a
contractually agreed to level of genetic purity at delivery. The American Soybean
Association ("ASA") has created guidance on Identity Preservation. See American Soy-
bean Association, Grower Opportunities for Identity Preserved Value-Added Soybeans, at
http://www.amsoy.org/ipvas/default.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
2. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, 2; Commission Regu-
lation 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 concerning the traceability and labeling of genetically modified organisms and
the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified orga-
nisms and amending Council Directive 2001/18/EEC, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, 25. The
European Union ("E.U.") directives on traceability and labeling 1829 and 1830 (9/
22/03) are collectively called "T&L Directives" throughout this article. See also Mar-
garet Rosso Grossman, Traceability and Labeling of GM Crops, Food, and Feed in the Euro-
pean Union, I J. OF FOOD L. & POL'Y 43 (2005).
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E.U. officials said these new T&L Directives would be followed by
a lifting of the de facto moratorium 3 on regulatory approval of bi-
otech crops,4 which has created a non-tariff barrier to trade with the
United States. In actuality, the new laws appear to be tailored to avoid
a legal challenge at the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), while
maintaining a regulatory system that denies entry to small traces of
biotech crops that have well-documented benefits to the environment
or public health.
This "zero tolerance" standard for unapproved biotech crops
(most of which are grown in the United States) will persist for years to
come, pending a WTO challenge and subsequent E.U. compliance
with a pro-U.S. ruling. E.U. trading partners will follow a similar "zero
tolerance" approach (e.g., China, New Zealand, Japan, etc.). Liability
for the grower could begin with a grower in the United States who
unwittingly purchased impure seed and knowingly or unknowingly
waived his right to a warranty of merchantability for fitness for the
intended purpose of export.
This article is structured to provide the reader with a brief over-
view, at Part II, of the E.U.'s complex regulatory policy and the United
States' reaction to the new E.U. laws. Over a dozen common forms of
crops (e.g., potatoes, tomatoes, etc.) have been dropped to date, in
large part due to antibiotech laws in the E.U.; these crops had passed
regulatory approval in the United States and had shown no signs of
adverse food safety or environmental effects. 5 While there are genu-
3. See CNN, Brussels Lfts E. U. Ban on GM Food, May 14, 2004, at http://edition.
cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/05/19/commision.gm/index.html/ (last visited
Jan. 20, 2005). The intervening years have featured no new regulatory approvals of
U.S.-based companies' applications for E.U. approval until early 2004, when
Syngenta's sweet corn was approved. See id. The European system for approval of
genetically modified crops for use in food and feed ground to a virtual halt in late
1997, catching the biotech industry and U.S. trade representatives by surprise. At
least two billion dollars in corn trade has been lost due to E.U. policies. See, e.g.,
Commission Brings GMO Moratorium to an End, AGRA EUROPE (May 21, 2004).
4. For purposes of this paper, crops produced using recombinant DNA ("rDNA")
methods will be referred to as "biotech crops."
5. See, e.g., Lance Gay, Hope for Biotech Foods Fizzles: Economics, Regulations Blamed,
and Market Fails to Materialize, DETROIT NEWS, May 16, 2004, available at http://www.
detnews.com/2004/business/0405/16/al 1-153949.htm.
A decade ago, amid much fanfare, the Food and Drug Administration ap-
proved for supermarket sales the first of what promised to be a new genera-
tion of genetically modified crops: an ordinary-looking tomato called the
Flavr Savr. Now, the Flavr Savr is nowhere to be found on market shelves.
Neither are any of the other genetically modified crops (e.g., strawberries,
melons, lettuce, potatoes, etc.) that won government approval after millions
of dollars spent on research and development. Id.
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ine concerns that have to be addressed, 6 these risks are manageable
and do not justify the worldwide moratorium on biotech crop market-
ing that E.U. policies will create.
In Part III, the authors review the case law on "nationwide nui-
sance" class action lawsuits-legal mechanisms that secure compensa-
tion for those impacts at stages in the chain of commerce where the
growers, seed companies, and grain buyers meet (i.e., common law of
warranty, nuisance, trespass, etc.). This article also reviews legal tools
available to U.S.-based businesses that could help prevent economic
loss and liability claims. These tools include grower agreements,
grower districts, and industry standards for "identity preservation.
' 7
After reviewing the tools proposed for preventing liability, in Part
IV this article further examines the E.U. policies on biotech crops and
briefly outlines the potential implications for the environment and
human health in the United States, the E.U., and their trading part-
ners around the world. The authors suggest that the E.U. policy can-
not be sustained, given troublesome "relative risks" posed by
traditionally-bred counterparts to existing biotech crops (from carcin-
ogen-free corn to soil-conserving biotech soybeans). If scientific anal-
ysis shows a genuine benefit from biotech crops for human health or
the environment, then both regulatory law and products liability law
will dictate the increased use of the "best available" technology (bi-
otech crops) as a tool for avoiding products liability and promoting
environmental conservation. History will not look kindly upon our
"Biotech Century" if we have banished from the marketplace the best
biotech innovations at the cost of countless harms, in terms of lives
and species lost.
See also E-mail from Kimball Nill, Technical Issues Director, International Marketing,
American Soybean Association to Thomas P. Redick (Sept. 21, 2004) (on file with
author) (stating that the following crops had each lost the ability to utilize biotech
due to commercial barriers: Flax, Tomato, Sugarbeet, Potato, Lettuce, Rice, Tobacco,
Wheat, and Melons). At the time of this article's publication, such crops are only
grown in field trials or tight containment to avoid commingling. See Andrew Pollack,
Narrow Path for New Biotech Food Crops, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at C1.
6. For example, there are wild relatives of the squash plant growing in the United
States that provide a genetic reservoir of genes of use for future plant breeding. If
biotech squash were to become so prevalent that it evolved into a weedy species (par-
ticularly one with herbicide resistance), there could be a potential environmental im-
pact to be managed. See, e.g., Jane Rissler of the Union of Concerned Scientists,
Comments at a USDA Public Meeting on a Transgenic Virus-Resistant Squash, June
21, 1994, at http://www.ucsusa.org/food and environment/biotechnology-archive/
page.cfm?pageID=380 (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
7. See generally supra note 1.
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II. The Trouble with "Zero Tolerance" Traceability
Voluntary traceability of food is common in certain industry sec-
tors. Many food companies use the voluntary international quality
standard ISO 9000 as a form of quality control,8 and some biotech
seed companies use traceability under the same standard.9 The
United States has entered into the realm of mandatory traceability for
food products as a counter-terrorism measure,1 0 using the "national
security exemption" to international trade agreements to justify the
costs these measures impose upon importing food products to the
United States.
The E.U. does not have a national securityjustification for tracing
and labeling GM products, so it relies upon a combination of food
safety and environmental protection concerns. Given the recent his-
tory of the regulation of food safety in the E.U., it is easy to under-
stand how the E.U. arrived at its embrace of the "precautionary
approach" to biotech crops. The E.U.'s fragmented and inadequate
regulatory system for food safety has failed consumers in many differ-
ent instances. The loss of faith in E.U. regulatory officials began with
the E.U.'s inability to prevent the outbreak of mad cow disease (bo-
vine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE), despite warning signs that
many scholars argue appeared all too clear in the harsh light of hind-
sight.11 The mad cow disease crisis arose from a protectionist refusal
to switch from domestic protein (other cows) to safe foreign soy pro-
tein sources, and a refusal to act quickly in response to early signs.
E.U. consumers on the mainland also endured other food safety cri-
ses, such as toxic dioxin-tainted poultry scandals in Belgium.1 2
Compounding these E.U. food safety failures, the United States
biotechnology industry suffered through two widely reported inci-
dents of illegal commingling of biotech crops not approved in the
United States for food. These incidents involved StarLink (seed only)
8. See generally International Organization for Standardization, Homepage, at http:
//www.iso.org (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
9. See, e.g., Pioneer, ISO 9000 Program at Pioneer, at http://www.pioneer.com/
pioneer__info/corporate/isoprog.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
10. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 596 (to be codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
11. See, e.g.,Joseph S. Levine, 20/20 Hindsight, Nova, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
nova/madcow/hindsight.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
12. See, e.g., Kelly Mescher, U.S. Exports to Europe Remain High; Concern over E. U 's
Traceability Laws Linger, SoYBEAN REv., Oct. 2002, at 14-15.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
corn 13 and ProdiGene corn containing piglet diarrhea vaccine, which
was plagued by two unintentional environmental releases in violation
of permits. 14 With both the E.U. regulations and the biotech industry
suffering from this recent disappointing track record, European con-
sumers are understandably suspicious of biotech crops from the
United States.
A. Regulation Nos. 1829 and 1830 of the European Parliament
The E.U. T&L Directives are intended to enhance the protection
of the health and welfare of humans, animals and the environment.
15
The new regulatory scheme establishes procedures authorizing GM
food and feed for distribution within the European Community
(E.C.). Biotech crops exported from the United States in shipments
of grain (known in the industry as "commodities") 16 must comply with
laws and regulations mandating labeling of both GM food and feed.
17
1. Regulation 1829-Labeling
Regulation 1829 amends existing E.U. directives on GM labeling
of imports, significantly expanding the scope of products that must be
labeled.18 While labeling has been required in the E.U. for some GM
food products since 1997 (i.e., those with detectable traces of biotech
GM crops), those regulations only required the labeling of GM seeds,
plants, and foods derived from GM plants that exhibited DNA or pro-
tein of a GM origin. If no trace of GM DNA or protein was present in
a final product, no GM label was required.19 GM animal feed was not
covered under the previous GM labeling system. 20 Under the new sys-
tem, however, all foods and animal feed with ingredients derived from
13. See In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834-35 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
14. See Peter Montague, Bumpy Road for Biotech, Environmental Research Founda-
tion, at http://www.rawfoodinfo.com/articles/art-bumpyroadforGE.html (last visited
Apr. 27, 2005).
15. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1.
16. See, e.g., Army Corps of Engineers, Navigation Data Information System, Great
Lakes Grain Traffic, at http://outreach.lrh.usace.army.mil/Industries/Grain/Grain%
20GL.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
17. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 2, 3.
18. See generally Grossman, supra note 2, for information on the E.U. regulatory
system for biotech crops.
19. See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. vs. EU: AN EXAMINATION





GM crops must be labeled, subject to a tolerance of 0.9 percent for
"accidental" (or "adventitious") presence of approved biotech crops. 21
The Labeling Directive tolerance of 0.9 percent only applies to bi-
otech crops that the E.U. has approved for food use.
Perhaps the most controversial section of Regulation No. 1829 is
Paragraph 16, which states that the regulation should cover food and
feed produced from a genetically modified organism ("GMO") that
has no detectible residue of genetic modification (e.g., soybean oil)
but not food and feed produced with a GMO. 22 This "distinction by
preposition" has vague determining criteria: that which is "from"
GMOs, like soybean oil, is subject to labeling and traceability, even if
any detectible residues derived "from" the GM source material are not
present. 23 That which is made "with" a GMO (e.g., cheeses using ren-
net enzymes derived from GM bacteria) is not subject to GM labels or
traceability, as long as no residue or the microbe remains in the
product.
The regulation elaborates upon this by describing a few different
scenarios where the regulation would not apply (e.g., products from
an animal fed "with" GMO feed) 24 Most notably, the enzymes and
processing aids manufactured by major E.U. companies, such as Novo
Nordisk,25 are exempt from regulation under the T&L Directives,
while soybean oil produced "from" soybeans grown in the United
States will be subject to labeling and tracing. The increased costs led
E.U. food manufacturers to switch to alternative sources of vegetable
oil, abandoning soybean oil inputs to avoid GM labels. The European
Commission officials have attempted to rationalize this distinction by
claiming that these are not GM ingredients, but merely processing
aids not present in the final product.
The following hypothetical involving beer manufacturers illus-
trates how the E.U.'s "distinction without a difference" could lead to
unfair discrimination against imports. By law, beer made in Germany
is subject to restrictions on the use of corn inputs, which is not the
case for beer in the United States and Japan. Beer in Germany can
use GM yeast, however, and comply with the E.U.'s T&L Directives,
21. See id.
22. See Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 2, 3.
23. See Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2, 3.
24. See Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) at 2, 3.
25. Novo NoRDISK, Novo NORDISK ANNUAL REPORT 2004 32-33 (2004), available at
http://www.novonordisk.com/investors/reports/reports.asp (explaining Novo Nor-
disk is a pharmaceutical company headquartered in the E.U. with offices in seventy-
eight countries).
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provided no detectible residue of micro-organisms is present. The fol-
lowing chart illustrates this "distinction without a difference."
PRECAUTIONARY PROTECTIONISM BY PREPOSITION:
THE E.U.'s "FROM V. WITH" DISTINCTION
Genetically Genetically European European
Modified Modified Union Union
Product YEAST? CORN? LABEL? TRACING?
Non-E.U. Beer No Yes Yes Yes
E.U. Beer Yes No No No
To the extent that beer from the United States or Japan has corn in-
puts, it may be forced to apply GM labels and maintain paperwork at
each stage of commerce, even if no GM yeast was used in the manufac-
turing process.
2. Regulation 1830-Traceability
As defined by Regulation No. 1830, traceability refers to the abil-
ity to trace GMOs and products produced from them (but not prod-
ucts made "with" them, such as cheese and beer) at all stages of their
production and distribution. 26 This regulation mandates tracing of
GM products from "farm to fork,"27 or more accurately "seed to shelf."
The grain industry and its suppliers will have to develop systems that
can identify to whom and from whom GM products were received.
These records of tracing must be made available to E.U. inspectors,
and all parties must retain their records for five years.
28
3. "Zero Tolerance" for Unapproved-in-E.U. Varieties
To reach the "zero tolerance" for unapproved-in-E.U. biotech
crops at every stage in the seed production, commercial harvest, and
26. See Commission Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, 25.
27. See Douglas Powell, What's in a GM Label?, Mar. 30, 2003, available at http://
www.foodsafetynetwork.ca/gmo/labelgm.htm.
[Consumers need a] full farm-to-fork tracing and segregation process that
can guarantee the origins of even the most minor of ingredients (such as the
cornstarch used to thicken the gravy in that frozen meat pie). Although
theoretically achievable, such a process is both difficult and enormously ex-
pensive. That's why every country that has implemented a mandatory label-
ing regime has also included an extensive network of exemptions and
loopholes. Id.
28. See Ferriere, infra note 41 ("Traceability will impose a five-year recordkeeping
requirement.")
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distribution process, U.S. producers must completely segregate GM
varieties from conventional varieties. The E.U. will allow some unin-
tentional mixing of approved or partially approved varieties at some
point in this process (e.g., through pollen drift, commingling in bins
that are not completely cleaned of grains, or even dust), if the amount
of detectable GM content does not rise above the applicable threshold
(0.5 percent or 0.9 percent) tolerances. 29 For biotech crops contain-
ing particular genetic events that are not yet approved, the permissi-
ble percentage of commingling is zero.
The E.U. regulatory approval system adds an extra layer of com-
plexity by creating a middle ground category for the "partially ap-
proved" biotech crop.30 This category allows a tolerance of 0.5
percent of particular GM genetic events that have not been fully ap-
proved by the European Commission but have initial clearance from
the European Commission Scientific Committee. That food will not
be barred from the European markets. 31 For biotech crops that do
not have such clearance, the regulatory tolerance remains at the com-
mercially impossible3 2 threshold of zero.
4. E.U. Officials Defend Their Directives
As part of its rationale for the tracing system, the E.U. cited in its
regulations the need for consumers to be fully informed as to GMOs
and products that contain them. 33 The E.U. believes this will help
restore consumer confidence in the food regulatory system, allowing
consumers to make better-informed decisions regarding foods that
may or may not contain GM ingredients.
Within the past three years, nearly every major official with a posi-
tion relating to the regulations, including E.U. Health and Consumer
Protection Commissioner David Byrne, 34 E.U. Environment Commis-
29. Id. Zero for varieties unapproved in European Union, 0.5 percent for prelimi-
nary clearance, 0.9 percent for labeling. Sonja Hillgren, Biotech and Fortress Europe,
FARM J., July 28, 2003, available at http://www.agweb.com/get-article.asp?pageid=
99799&newscat=GN.
30. See Grossman, supra note 2.
31. See Hillgren, supra note 29.
32. The legal doctrine of "commercial impossibility" is discussed infra at III.D.1.
While the European Union was perhaps unaware of this readily foreseeable complica-
tion, its traceability system introduces a "zero tolerance" for products that do not pose
a wider recognized health risk.
33. Commission Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 25.
34. News Release, European Union, Authorizations, Consumer Confidence Key to
GMO Acceptance in Europe, Feb. 3, 2004, available at http://www.eurunion.org/
news/press/200 4 / 2 0 0 4 0 0 13.htm.
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sioner Margot Wallstrom,35 and the Minister-Counselor for Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Consumer Affairs of the European Commission,
Tony Van der Haegen,3 6 have all gone on record as justifying the new
rules with similar rhetoric about "consumer confidence" and "collec-
tive preferences." In evocative language, European activist groups
have also argued that GM food should not be "crammed down the
throats" of E.U. consumers,3 7 while also noting that the new regula-
tions will accompany an opening of the closed E.U. approval process
for biotech crops.
However, with the ostensible "lifting of the moratorium" 38 that
accompanied the passage of the T&L Directives (and the approval
E.U.-wide of some biotech corn varieties) the backlash in E.U. mem-
ber states has begun. As this article was being submitted for publica-
tion, the Friends of the Earth activist group announced an initiative
that would encourage member states in the E.U. to create "GM free"
zones within their borders.
39
Member of the European Parliament Janusz Wojciechowski, Vice-
President of the Agriculture Committee, said:
Poland and other new E.U. Member states want to avoid the errors
that the old E.U. Member states made in the past in order to pre-
serve our traditional agriculture. We may produce less than them
but our food must be natural and consumer-friendly. Only such a




In a presentation given at Iowa State University on November 14,
2003, Jean Ferriere of the E.U.'s Trade Directorate informed an audi-
ence of United States growers and grain shippers that the E.U.'s new
35. See Farming: "Genuine Fear" of GMOs in Europe, NATIONALIST (CARLOW, IRELAND),
July 15, 2002, available at http://archives.tcm.ie/carlownationalist/2002/07/15/
story2310.asp.
36. Press Release, Pew Initiative, Consumer Trust in Government Is Key to Policies
on Genetically Modified Food - on Both Sides of the Atlantic, Oct. 24, 2001, available
at http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/releases/102401.php3.
37. See, e.g., Commission Brings GMO Moratorium to an End, AGRA EUROPE (May 21,
2004).
38. See Grossman, supra note 2, at 45-46.
39. Barbara Thauront, Independent Media Centre, Campaign for GM Free Zones and
Regions Gathers Force, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.indymedia.ie/newswire.
php?story-id=66573%26printpage=true%26includecomments=true; see also infra
Section III D (discussing the creation of such "GM free" zones).
40. See Thauront, supra note 39.
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T&L Directives would target non-GMO shipments. 41 When pressed
about enforcement capacity, he acknowledged the role that non-gov-
ernmental organizations would play in conducting independent tests
that could find traces of unapproved-in-E.U. varieties in grain ship-
ments arriving at E.U. ports. The E.U. is adding testing centers to
help activists currently enforcing its regulatory program track biotech
crop content in United States products that were not previously sub-
ject to scrutiny for unapproved-in-E.U. biotech content.
Reports of Greenpeace 42 testing commodities, shipments, and
food products are fueling concerns that United States commodity
shipments may be denied entry.43 As explained later in this article,
the testing of shipments for evidence of unapproved events (each vari-
ant of a new trait introduced by biotech methods is a regulated "ge-
netic event") can lead to liability-triggering events that trace back, via
contractual warranties, to a producer who sold an unapproved-in-E.U.
variety to a grain buyer. Like a row of dominoes toppling by prior
agreement, each seller of the unapproved variety can be held liable
under commercial law (breach of warranty) for causing the "contami-
nation" of a large quantity of export soybeans with varieties of biotech
crops that lack approval in major overseas markets. In anticipation of
such claims, insurers have rewritten policies for grain shippers and
growers, excluding liabilities relating to biotech crops (with the risks
of unapproved varieties of biotech crops driving the change).44
B. U.S. Critique: Pretextual Regulations and the Cheese/Beer Loopholes
The E.U.'s T&L Directives did not arrive without significant ad-
vance notice and discussion among United States and E.U. govern-
ments and their respective industry leaders. The U.S. government
and the E.U. governments have engaged in a "Transatlantic Business
41. Notes from speech by Jean Ferriere, Presentation to Public Forum on the Eu-
ropean Union Traceability and Labeling Regulations, Iowa State University (Nov. 14,
2003) (explaining that "non-GMO" shipments will be periodically tested to verify that
non-declarations are true) (on file with authors).
42. See generally Greenpeace, About Us, at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/
aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2005) (explaining that Greenpeace is a well-known
organization that is concerned with environmental issues); Greenpeace, Global Action
for a Global Problem, at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/global-action-for-a-
global-pro (last visited Apr. 11, 2005) ("To protect the public's health and prevent the
contamination of the environment, [Greenpeace is] confronting genetic engineering
everywhere [they] can, be it along the export routes or along the food chain.").
43. See Reuters Newswire, Greenpeace Bars Argentine GMO Soy From Brazil Port (May 3,
2004) (on file with author).
44. See, e.g., Marc S. Mayerson, Insurance Recovery for Losses from Contaminated or Ge-
netically Modified Foods, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. J. 837 (2004).
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Dialogue" ("TABD") 45 for nearly a decade that has discussed various
trade issues, including E.U. member nations' objections to biotech
crops.4 6 The TABD recommended the formation of an E.U.-U.S. in-
dustry and government group that allowed E.U. and U.S. biotechnol-
ogy and food corporations to meet regularly. The TABD's biotech
initiative, led by Unilever 4 7 and Monsanto,48 was formed "to identify
potential causes for trade difficulties and propose ways to eliminate
them."4 9 In 1998, this process was viewed by the United States as a
lever for lifting the E.U. "moratorium" on regulatory approval for bi-
otech crops, such as Bt corn (a category of biotech crop that had sev-
eral unapproved varieties commingled in U.S. corn supply in 1998).50
Over time, however, the TABD came to realize that the E.U. vision of
biotechnology process-based labels would create barriers to trade.
51
45. See, e.g., Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue U.S. Office, Trans-Atlantic Business Di-
alogue Report to the U.S.-E. U. Summit in Ireland, 26 June 2004: Establishing a Barrier-Free
Transatlantic Market: Principles and Recommendations, available at http://128.121.v145.19
/tabd/media/TABDReportFINAL22AprilUS.pdf (mentioning agriculture, including
subsidies but not biotech crops). The TABD group provides recommendations and
agenda items for U.S.-E.U. economic summits, not exclusive to biotech issues. See,
e.g., Transatlantic Business Dialog, About the TABD, at www.tabd.com/about (last vis-
ited Apr. 27, 2005).
46. See generally TABD, Rome Communiqug, Nov. 7, 1997, available at http://128.121.
145.19/tabd/media/1997RomeCEOReport.pdf) (forming joint TABD group on bi-
otech issues and indicating "agri-biotechnology" is a particular area for reform); see
also Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, TransAtlantic Business Dialogue: Corporate
Conspiracy, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views/112000-
103.htm (referring to the "top U.S. side concerns: Italian restrictions on genetically
modified foods").
47. E.U.-based Unilever is comprised of various entities that make up one of the
world's largest food and personal care products companies. See generally UNILEVER,
UNILEVER ANNUAL REVIEW 2003 (2004), available at http://www.unilever.com/images/
annualreview English -03 -tcm3-4018_tcm13-5396.pdf.
48. U.S.-based Monsanto is a biotech company focused on increasing agricultural
productivity through science. See Monsanto Company, About Us, at http://www.
monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/about-us/default.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
49. TABD: Tiptoeing Toward a Transatlantic Market, CORP. EUROPE OBSERVER (CEO
Quarterly Newsletter, Amsterdam), May, 1998 at 1, available at http://www.corporate
europe.org/observerl/tabd.html.
50. Id. (stating that "Franklin Vargo, acting assistant secretary of commerce, is jubi-
lant about this 'closer and more productive U.S.-European cooperation."' In particu-
lar, Vargo mentions that the NTA process has "solved obstacles that had prevented
U.S. exports of genetically engineered 'BT corn."').
51. See, e.g., TABD, Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue Report (TABD) 2001 CEO Report,
at 10, available at http://128.121.145.19/tabd/media/2001DCBrusselsCEOReport.
pdf (noting potential "technical barriers to trade" including "process and production
labeling (PPMs) [such as] mandatory biotechnology labeling" that would create trade
barriers); see also TABD, Chicago Conference Report, at 32, available at http://128.121.
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1. United States Government
When the E.U. proposed its T&L Directives, the Bush Administra-
tion asserted that the E.U. labeling scheme was unnecessary and
pretextual (i.e., illegal trade discrimination favoring domestic inter-
ests). On May 21, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush referred to
the theme of "unfounded, unscientific fears" that allegedly motivated
the E.U. in pursuing its biotech agenda.52 In the same speech, Presi-
dent Bush reiterated the belief that the E.U.'s stance has brought
about a secondary problem, as its policy contributed to the hunger
problems in Africa. 53 Moreover, this unwarranted focus on a non-exis-
tent threat posed by tiny bits of DNA, in a world that happily con-
sumes traces of animal feces, insect parts, and known carcinogens, 54
may distract regulatory agencies from their appointed task of regulat-
ing actual risks to health.
U.S. Undersecretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Af-
fairs Alan Larson questioned the scientific basis for the E.U.'s require-
ment of labels on GM foods and called upon the E.U. to utilize
rigorous, legitimate scientific risk assessment to dictate policy.55 Lar-
son cited a European Commission study that reviewed eighty studies
on biotech crops, and this study found that classical (i.e., conven-
tional) food safety risks could exceed those posed by biotech crops.56
Paragraph 16 of Regulation No. 1829 distinguishes between food
and feed produced "from" a GMO and food and feed produced "with"
a GMO without a scientific basis.5 7 This distinction fails to recognize
that the only arguable human injury to be documented in scientific
145.19/tabd/media/2002ChicagoCEOReport.pdf (stating that "mandatory labeling
should be limited to only what is necessary to ensure public and environmental
safety").
52. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Bush Lashes Out at Europe on GMO-Ban: President Says
Aversion to Biotech Perpetuates African Hunger, WASH. POST, May 22, 2003, at AOI, availa-
ble at http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/wto/news/O522bush-europe-
gmo_ban.htm.
53. Since this speech, new evidence of mycotoxin-related deaths in Kenya adds
potential toxicity to the threats faced by Africans.
54. See, e.g., U.S. FooD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMPs) for the 21st Century-Food Processing § 2 ("Fruit is usually contaminated by
direct or indirect contact with animal feces."), available at www.cfsan.fda.gov/-acro-
bat/gmp-2.pdf.
55. Undersecretary Alan P. Larson, U.S. Differences with Europe on Plant Biotech-
nology, Remarks Before the Cato Institute (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.
state.gov/e/rls/rm/2002/13793.htm.
56. See id.
57. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 2; see also supra notes 24-
28 and accompanying text.
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literature and associated (however hypothetically) with biotechnology
arose from a product made "with" a GM bacterium. 58 The E.U. would
place GMOs in a higher-risk category than GM bacteria or other mi-
crobes, even if this category has been accused of causing thirty-seven
deaths.59 Since the E.U.'s "from v. with distinction" is based upon hy-
pothetical fears, the "with" exception to GM labeling lacks any scien-
tific basis.
60
2. World Trade Organization Action
To combat the E.U.'s mistaken application of the "precautionary
principle" to biotech crops that have proved their worth, the United
States has initiated an action at the WTO. The Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1993)61 created the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement. This granted countries the right to regu-
late food products but required that they be "based on scientific prin-
ciples. '62 By this, a product must be scientifically shown to be harmful
before a country may restrict imports of it.63 Under the WTO agree-
ment, the E.U. must prove through scientific principles that biotech
crops are inherently less safe than traditionally-bred crops.64
In addition to this WTO attack against E.U. policy, the United
States also claims that many other trade violations stem from the
E.U.'s treatment of GMOs. These arguments were included in the
WTO action brought by the United States, Canada, and Argentina on
58. The activist groups promoting a genetically modified free Europe repeatedly
refer to "thirty-seven deaths" caused by L-tryptophan produced in genetically modi-
fied bacterium in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Ronnie Cummins, Exposing Biotech's Big Lies,
IN MOTION MAGAZINE, May 23, 2002, available at www.inmotionmagazine.com/ra02/
geffl4.html. But see Hong Kong Gov., Food and Envir. Hygiene Dep't, Safe Food &
Public Health, at http://www.fehd.gov.hk/safefood/gmf/gen-info3.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2005) (assuring consumers that the deaths were caused by contaminants
rather than by the bacterium itself).
59. See, e.g., Soil Association, L -Tryptophan: What Made This GM Food Supplement Kill
37 People and Disable 1500?, available at http://www.soilassociation.org/web/sa/
saweb.nsf/library?openform&catGMO:_technicalinformation.
60. See, e.g., John Fagan, Ph.D., The Facts About Genetic Tryptophan: A Summary, No-
vember, 1997, available at http://www.zmag.org/Bulletins/ptry.htm (concluding "it is
highly likely that genetic engineering was the determining factor in generating this
toxin").
61. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Genetically Modified Organisms
Still Source of US-EU Tension, July 30, 2003, at http://www.globalizationlOl.org/news.
asp?NEWSID=55 (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See generally id.
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May 13, 2003,65 which attacked the E.U.'s use of the "precautionary
principle" for biotech crop approval on the grounds that it violates
trade law.
66
A five-year "moratorium" on regulatory approval of biotech crops
was created by the E.U.'s failure to approve any new GM crops during
that time frame. 67 This blocked American exports from entering the
E.U. U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert
estimated that American farmers experienced a monetary loss during
that time of $300 million per year on corn alone, and that number
could exceed $4 billion by 2005.68 An academic based in Switzerland
reported both soybeans and corn from the United States suffered a
combined loss of up to $1.9 billion per year in lost trade with the
E.U.
6 9
In March 2003, E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy con-
tended that the E.U. would prevail in this trade dispute before the
WTO.70 The VTO allows legislation that addresses the health and
welfare of the E.U.'s population if the regulations are based upon
"proportional, transparent, scientific advice. ' 71 The E.U. specifically
disclaimed the idea that the regulations were protectionist mea-
65. BBC NEWS, WORLD EDITION, VVTO to Probe Europe's GMO Policy, Aug. 29, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3191395.stm.
66. See id.
67. See generally BBC NEws, WORLD EDITION, EU "Regrets" U.S. Action on GM Crops
(Aug. 8, 2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/
3135763.stm.
68. See PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 19.
69. THOMAS BERNAUER, GENES, TRADE AND REGULATION: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT IN
FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY, 126-28 (2003). Bernauer estimates $200-400 million annual
loss since 1997 in corn and corn byproducts (e.g., gluten). Soybean exports declined
from $2.6 billion in 1996 to $1.1 billion in 2002 due in large part to labeling and
substitution of soy by food producers who purchased Brazilian non-GMO soy instead.
Bernauer considers traceability and labeling for all food and feed "more worrying"
since "all U.S. corn and soybean exports" to the European Union could collapse.
In the worst case, U.S. producers will find that the cost of forgoing exports to
the European Union is smaller than the cost of restructuring the U.S. crop
handling system so as to comply with E.U. regulations . . . U.S. farmers are
likely to face a disadvantage vis-i-vis countries that opt entirely for non-GE
production. For obvious reasons, it will always be cheaper to operate the
entire crop-handling system of a country on a non-GE crop basis than to
segregate GE and non-GE crops. In brief, the prospects for U.S. corn and
soy exports to Europe are rather bleak. Id. at 128-29.
70. Press Conference with Pascal Lamy, E.U. Trade Commissioner, Washington
D.C. (Mar. 4, 2003), at http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2003/030304Pr-
Confpl.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
71. See id.
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sures. 72 However, E.U. corn farmers certainly reaped benefits from
the exclusion of U.S. corn as the E.U. can easily meet its corn needs
with a combination of its own production and non-United States im-
ports. 73 For feed, however, Bernauer suggests that there are not ade-
quate non-GMO supplies of soybeans and that the outlook for United
States genetically engineered soy exports to the E.U. is somewhat bet-
ter than for genetically engineered corn because it appears harder for
the E.U. to find substitutes for genetically engineered soy at similar
cost.
7 4
3. United States' Growers React To Economic Impacts of
Traceability
One of the biggest stakeholders in the United States is the Ameri-
can Soybean Association ("ASA"), which sold $9.7 billion in annual
exports of U.S. soy products worldwide in 2004.75 ASA has taken the
position that biotech crops approved for food are completely safe for
E.U. consumers, but the regulatory scheme established by the E.U.
presents a standard that is too burdensome for most companies in the
United States to attain. 76 For the seed companies, a one hundred per-
cent guarantee of seed purity is not commercially feasible, 77 yet grow-
ers are asked by grain buyers to provide them with a one hundred
percent pure warranty due to the grain buyers' need to meet "zero
tolerance" under the E.U. T&L Directives. These growers face the risk
of their 99.9 percent pure product being rejected, or even worse, caus-
ing an entire ship's cargo to be lost.
The ASA has repeatedly reiterated its opposition to the T&L Di-
rectives, referring to the regulations as non-tariff barriers to trade and
72. See id.
73. See BERNAUER, supra note 69 at 129. For soy, however, the E.U. has a self-suffi-
ciency level of around 10 percent for whole soybeans, 5 percent for soy meal, and 20
percent for soy oil. Food soy consumption amounts to only one million tons annually
which is easily supplied by non-genetically engineered sources. See id. at 129.
74. See id.
75. See American Soybean Association, Statistics, at http://www.asa-europe.org/
Statistics/statistics.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
76. See generally American Soybean Association, ASA Supports WTO Biotech Case
Against European Union, at http://www.iasoybeans.com/whatnew/relatednewsarchive/
asa051503.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
77. Kelly Mescher, U.S. Exports to Europe Remain High; Concern Over E. U 's Traceability




violations of the E.U.'s WTO obligations. 7 ASA fears that the E.U.
and activist groups would pressure other countries and trading part-
ners to implement similar standards, perpetuating the
discrimination.
79
The United States government and the E.U. government en-
gaged in a dialogue in 2001 that considered lifting the E.U. "morato-
rium" on regulatory approval in exchange for the United States
agreeing to a mandatory "traceability" system to make regulatory ap-
proval more palatable for E.U. Member States (and also reversible, in
terms of recalling any varieties that were approved in error).80 While
persons within the seed industry made several public statements indi-
cating support for such a trade-off, the ASA, the United Soybean
Board, and the National Oilseed Processors Association (ASA/USB/
NOPA) disagreed and communicated with the seed industry in 2001
to express the concerns of commodity exporters regarding the poten-
tial adverse impact of traceability upon the shipment of commodities
worldwide. ASA/USB/NOPA predicted that the E.U. would try to
make the traceability system a global standard for managing grain
shipments, and the E.U. is currently engaged in doing precisely that
via Article 18.2 of the Biosafety Protocol.
8 1
Taking the soybean producers as an example, the challenges of
E.U.-style tracing can be demonstrated by following the soybeans from
harvest to market. Soybeans are first harvested throughout the region
of the Midwest United States and transported by wagons or trucks to a
common holding bin. They are then taken to a regional center
before being loaded onto barges for transport down the Mississippi
River. After they reach the Gulf of Mexico, they are transferred onto
ocean-going vessels for transport to Europe. At each stage of trans-
port and storage, the soybeans mix and commingle with each other,
rendering specific identification and tracing impossible.8 2 "Grower
districts" have been discussed as a possible option for segregating bi-
otech crops; these are commonly used in Idaho and Washington to
78. See, e.g., Press Release, American Soybean Association, ASA Urges USTR to Chal-
lenge EU Traceability and Labeling Requirements (Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://www.
soygrowers.com/newsroom/releases/2003%20releases/rl 12503.htm.
79. See id. (quoting ASA President Ron Heck).
80. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
81. See E-mail from Kimball Nill, Technical Director of International Marketing,
American Soybean Association, to Thomas Redick, author of this article, dated Dec.
13, 2004 (on file with author).
82. See id. See also Mescher, supra note 77.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
avoid commingling of industrial rapeseed with its related food crop,
rapeseed used for canola oil.83
C. Global Tracing of Commodity Shipments Via the Biosafety Protocol
The E.U. traceability regime specifically invokes environmental
protection as one of the reasons for its passage, singling out biotech
crops for scrutiny under a "precautionary approach" due to the poten-
tial environmental impacts of biotech products. A new international
treaty, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ("Biosafety Protocol"), is
designed to address these impacts. The Biosafety Protocol entered
into force on September 11, 2003 and will become the law mandating
traceability for genetic events for its parties on September 11, 2005.
s 4
The Biosafety Protocol could provide the E.U. with an argument that
customary international law has evolved to recognize the "precaution-
ary principle" (as implemented in a "precautionary approach") as a
legally justified approach to regulatory approval for GMOs (or "living
modified organisms" and "LMOs" under the Biosafety Protocol).85
The provision of the Biosafety Protocol that mandates tracing of
biotech crop inputs in global grain commodity commerce is Article
18.2(a), which reads as follows:
Living modified organisms that are intended for direct use as food
or feed, or for processing, clearly identifies that they "may contain"
living modified organisms and are not intended for intentional in-
troduction into the environment, as well as a contact point for fur-
83. See, e.g., Canola and Rapeseed Production and Development Act, IDAHO CODE
§ 22-4701. (Michie 2004); Rapeseed Production and Establishment of Districts, WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 16-570-010 (Wash. Dep't of Agric. 2004) (setting forth the administra-
tive provisions governing the Washington production districts).
84. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIvERsITY & U.N. ENVI-
RONMENT PROGRAMME, BIOSAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 5 (2003), available at http://www.biodiv.org/
doc/press/presskits/bs/cpbs-unep-cbd-en.pdf. While the Biosafety Protocol techni-
cally entered into force on September 11, 2003, the parties to the protocol needed a
meeting to establish the ground rules for implementing the protocol. Biosafety Clear-
ing-House, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, at http://bch.biodiv.org/about/protocol.
shtml (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). The first Meeting of the Parties ("MOP") to the
Biosafety Protocol was held February 23-27, 2004, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the Conven-
tion Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, at http://www.biodiv.org/
meetings/mop-01 (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). The seventh meeting of the Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP-7), which pro-
vided the terms of reference for the Biosafety Protocol, met in Kuala Lumpur from
February 9-20, 2004. Id.
85. See BIOsAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 4 (explaining that
"LMOs" is another term for "GMOs").
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ther information. The Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take a decision on the
detailed requirements for this purpose, including specification of
their identity and any unique identification, no later than two years
after the date of entry into force of this Protocol. 86
As the E.U. enforces "zero tolerance" traceability for unapproved-
in-E.U. varieties, other countries could follow its lead. These coun-
tries could possibly include nations that do not export to the E.U., but
which export to a nation that has trade with the E.U.
The E.U. will use the Biosafety Protocol Article 18.2(a) to estab-
lish itself as the Slowest Common Unapproved Denominator
("SCUD"), leading other nations to deny imports of commodities con-
taining any trace of unapproved-in-E.U. biotech crops. Since those
nations will then be denied any health benefits or environmental con-
servation advantages of these biotech crops, they will all share in the
E.U.'s lowered levels of protection of environmental and human
health. 87 This is the "SCUD" effect, aptly named for the devastating
long-range impact that E.U. policy can have;88 if Article 18.2 (a) of the
Biosafety Protocol is implemented in a manner that encourages the
SCUD effect, this could cause a rapid spread of trade barriers that
would be comparable to the long-standing E.U. moratorium on entire
U.S. corn shipments.
Indeed, in late 2004, the scientific advisory group appointed to
advise the parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") issued a report suggesting that all corn shipments to Mex-
ico from the United States should be milled prior to entry into Mex-
ico.8 9 The advisory group, the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"), made this suggestion to protect
86. See Council Decision 2002/628, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 48, 55 (emphasis added).
87. See Biotechnology Industry Organization, Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology, at
http://www.bio.org/foodag/background/epabenefits.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005);
German Research Foundation, Statement by the DFG on the Draft Legislation to Reform the
Law on Genetic Engineering, at http://www.dfg.de/aktuelles-presse/reden-stellung
nahmen/2004/ (stating biotech crops can be specifically adapted to developing na-
tions' yield needs for food crops) (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
88. See Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Preci-
sion Warfare, 37 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L., 431 n.181 (2005) (describing a scud missile as
a "weapon incapable of [the proper] accuracy that would [be needed to] allow the
proper selection of military targets over civilian population").
89. See COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, MAIZE & BIODIVERSlTY: THE
EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC MAIZE IN MEXICO: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
("CEC Report"), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/Maize-and-Biodiversity-
en.pdf (suggesting that Mexico "strengthen the moratorium on commercial planting"
by "milling transgenic grain at the point of entry").
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Mexico's corn production from unwanted commingling with unap-
proved genetic events that may be present in United States corn ship-
ments and are not approved for environmental release in Mexico.
Fourteen industry associations including corn, soy, cotton, and wheat
growers, as well as the Biotechnology Industry Organization, promptly
forwarded a letter objecting to the suggestion that milling of corn
shipments from the United States be required to protect
biodiversity. 90
The CEC's report will rightfully endure intense scrutiny because
it appears to have ignored the potential health effects of forced mill-
ing, which leads to transportation and storage methods that may allow
the formation of harmful mold and other mycotoxins (which are
known to cause health problems in Mexico).91 It also appears to have
ignored the less burdensome alternatives to milling, including the
measures used to contain certain weed seeds present within commodi-
ties under the International Plant Protection Convention, 92 which
mandates the use of tarps, mowing of areas adjacent to rail lines, and
other related measures to prevent the release of certain weed seeds
into the environment that are already present within commodities
shipments.
Even if drastic measures such as the "mill at the border" are
averted, United States grain shippers will still face a serious dilemma
under the emerging traceability regimes mandated by the E.U. and
the Biosafety Protocol. If grain shippers from major grain-exporting,
biotech-growing nations (e.g., United States, Canada, Argentina, Bra-
zil, etc.) ship unapproved varieties into a nation and successfully off-
load all product, the shipper could still be liable for traces of unap-
proved varieties under a warranty obligation (applying international
commercial law) and possibly a regulatory violation under the domes-
tic law of the importing nation. At its logical extreme, even a nation
receiving food aid could set up trade barriers because it hopes to ex-
90. See Letter from American Farm Bureau Federation, et al. to Michael Leavitt,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (Oct.18, 2004), available at http://
www.nopa.org/content/newsroom.
91. See, e.g., Margorie A. Peraza et al., Modulation of Chemical Toxicity and Risk Assess-
ment, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, Aug. 1997, available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/
members/ 1997/105-8/peraza-full.html ("Mycotoxins are by-products of fungal con-
tamination of food crops, most common in corn, peanuts and cottonseed .... in
Mexico [ ] the rural, tropical conditions often result in contamination of corn, a ma-
jor agricultural product and food source.").
92. The International Plant Protection Convention is an international treaty re-
lated to plant health that has been signed by over 135 countries. See The Interna-
tional Plant Protection Convention, at http://www.ippc.int (last visited May 16, 2005).
[VOL. 1:8 7
2005] E.U. NON-TARRIFF BARRIERS 107
port to the E.U., which Zambia has already done, citing the Biosafety
Protocol as its legal support.93
The Biosafety Protocol also has a specific "liability and redress"
element (Article 27) still under negotiation that would create liability
for biotech crops under an international liability protocol.94 In the
future, as a result of Article 27 of the Biosafety Protocol or national
laws on liability, businesses in the United States may see strict liability
applied to require "remediation" of biotech crops growing in places
where they are not wanted (comparable to the StarLink testing, recall
and remediation process) 95 via United States court claims filed for
"harm" to biodiversity that occurs abroad.
III. LIABILITY FOR BIOTECH CROPS UNDER UNITED STATES
COMMON LAW TORTS
The primary United States liability events that may be triggered
by this regulatory regime include: (1) shipments that are turned away
at foreign ports for unapproved-overseas biotech content, (2) food
product recalls, and (3) environmental remediation costs. The latter
two would arise from shipments of unapproved-overseas varieties that
are not detected and turned away, leading to the spread of crops
within a food supply or ecosystem long after they are released into
commerce or the environment.
The legal claims that would arise from these factual settings
would include: (1) nuisance liability claims for neighbors who are
sued for breach of warranty and are left looking for someone to
blame, (2) contractual breaches of warranty obligations to customers,
and (3) various regulatory-based liability theories that arise when im-
port controls are violated and a regulatory recall is ordered (as oc-
curred with StarLink corn in the United States and Pringles potato
chips, which were recalled from the Japanese food supply when an
unapproved-in-Japan GM potato event was discovered in Pringles pul-
93. M.M. Lewanika, Establishing Acceptance: Biosafety Regulation in Zambia, 47 Bio-
TECHNOLOGY AND DEV. MONITOR, Sept. 2001, available at http://www.biotech-monitor.
nl/4706.htm.
94. Compare the Biosafety Protocol to what emerged ten years after the Basel Con-
vention on Hazardous Waste, which passed a non-retroactive, joint and several liability
protocol, see generally Secretariat of the Basel Convention, United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal Adopted by the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on 22 March
1989, available at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e.htm.
95. See, e.g., In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
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led from the shelves of a grocery store in Japan).96 This article will
confine itself to a discussion of nuisance and warranty liability scena-
rios, and leave the international regulatory enforcement scenario for
another author.
Since grain shippers will want to avoid these liability issues, sup-
pliers (such as elevators growers) who sell their grain may be asked to
warrant the genetic purity of their product. For any liabilities that
arise in the future, grain shippers in the United States may seek to
enforce the typical "pass-through" warranties going back to the grow-
ers. These grain suppliers may be asked at some point in the future to
contribute toward the cost of recalling unapproved varieties that were
released in small amounts but are technically illegal due to "zero toler-
ance" standards. Growers may encounter seed companies who suc-
cessfully disclaim liability for warranty. In the end the liability may be
contractually allocated to growers, who are not insured or adequately
capitalized to handle this level of commercial risk.
A. The StarLink Decision
Biotech crops lacking regulatory approval in major overseas mar-
kets are potentially an "economic nuisance," which is a relatively new
invention of the common law when applied to biotech crops. This
can include "private" nuisance (such as neighbor to neighbor,
through pollen flow or other commingling) 97 and "public" nuisance
(such as public harms caused by a biotech seed company). Commin-
gling of an unapproved-in-E.U. variety may be found analogous to
blocking a public road, contaminating a river or an air purifier, or
rendering an entire county's corn crop unfit for its intended market.
While the boundary between nuisance and trespass is not well de-
fined doctrinally,98 the modern trend in trespass recognizes airborne
96. See generally JUAN LOPEZ VILLAR, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL, GMO
CONTAMINATION AROUND THE WORLD, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.foe.org/
camps/comm/safefood/gefood/foodaid/contamination.pdf. On June 21, 2001, Ja-
pan's Calbee Foods Co. Ltd. voluntary recalled some of its snack products after traces
of illegal genetically modified NewLeaf Plus Potato were found. The same type of GM
potato was found in "Pringles" chips manufactured by Procter and Gamble, which was
forced to pull 800,000 packets off the Japanese market. Id. at 15.
97. See E. Ann Clark, The Implications of the Schmeiser Decision, available at http://
www.percyschmeiser.com/crime.htm (discussing the farmer Percy Schmeiser, who
made headlines with his alleged theft of Monsanto's intellectual property which he
claimed was a nuisance); see also Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser and Schmeiser,
[2001] F.C. 256.
98. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 16.03[1] ("It is practical to
consider a trespass cause of action along with nuisance where appropriate, although
[VOL. 1:8 7
E.U. NON-TARRIFF BARRIERS
pollution as a trespass where the plaintiff can demonstrate physical
damage to his property (including loss of marketability).99 The Star-
Link case extended this to include economic loss caused by a biotech
crop's pollen drift or post harvest commingling, recognizing claims
for both trespass and nuisance. 100
On July 11, 2002, a federal district court judge in Chicago denied
a motion to dismiss a "novel" claim whereby growers injured by the
FDA-mandated recall of StarLink corn sought compensatory damages
and an injunction for a public and private nuisance.101 This decision
was a groundbreaking and fairly comprehensive precedent suggesting
liability standards for biotech crops in a variety of states. 10 2 U.S. Dis-
trictJudge James B. Moran denied a motion to dismiss farmers' claims
for strict product liability, consumer fraud, negligence, and public
and private nuisance alleging economic loss 103 in twenty-seven consol-
some courts differentiate between the two... Some courts do not differentiate but
just treat nuisance and trespass as identical, with the same evidence requirements.").
99. See, e.g., Born v. Exxon Corp., 388 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1980) (quoting Bor-
land v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979)); Wilson v. Interlake Steel
Co., 649 P.2d 922 (Cal. 1982); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 786
(Wash. 1985); see Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land
Caused by Airborne Pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054 (1980).
100. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
see also Sample v. Monsanto, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (discussing
"physical injury" and g--anting summaryjudgment in favor of Monsanto on tort claims
alleging economic loss from unapproved-in-E.U. crops but alleging no actual com-
mingling or "physical injury").
101. See In re StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
102. See, e.g., id. As previously noted, StarLink corn was approved for feed by the
EPA, but not for food uses. As a condition of approval, Aventis was required to main-
tain an adequate identity preservation program to keep StarLink out of the food sup-
ply. Aventis apparently thought that commingling problems, should they arise, would
be worked out with food regulators to allow some percentage of unapproved StarLink
in food. Id.
103. See id. While the "economic loss" doctrine is a matter for strict products liabil-
ity analysis beyond the scope of this article, it could represent a barrier to recovery in
some settings arising from environmental releases of biotech crops causing economic
loss. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-75
(1986). Some federal courts have applied the East River economic loss doctrine to
consumer, as well as commercial, purchasers of vessels. See, e.g., Somerset Marine,
Inc. v. Forespar Prods. Corp., 876 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
East River applies in consumer as well as commercial transactions); Cf Sherman v.
Johnson & Towers Balt., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 501-02 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that
East River is not applicable to consumer losses) and Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotech-
nology, Property Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 237 (2002) (stating
that "[i]n some states, mere economic loss from defendant's negligence will not be
compensated; plaintiff must also prove physical harm to property").
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idated actions10 4 in multidistrict litigation ("MDL"). 05
Plaintiff farmers had filed consolidated class actions on behalf of
a nationwide class of corn farmers alleging common law claims for:
(1) negligence, (2) strict liability, (3) private nuisance, (4) public nui-
sance, and (5) conversion, as well as statutory claims under (6) the
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1997 and (7) the North Caro-
lina Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiffs sued the seed developer
and seed companies. The seed companies moved to dismiss, and the
court denied the motion, recognizing claims for negligence, strict
product liability, private nuisance, public nuisance, and consumer
fraud. 106 Within months of the denial of the motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs settled for up to $110 million, with notice given to thousands
of corn growers who lost money due to depressed corn prices. 10 7
Future cases filed by organic or non-GM crop growers may cite
this decision to support claims for nuisance arising from the sale and
production of unapproved-in-E.U. varieties of biotech crops. If com-
mingling occurs through pollen drift, or a "volunteer" emerging from
grain left on the ground in a prior harvest or through post-harvest
commingling, growers suffering economic loss from commingling can
claim the economic loss under resurgence, issuance or trespass arising
from the negligent or unreasonable marketing of a particular biotech
crop, and thousands of growers similarly situated may recover for
their economic loss. As the law evolves to encompass the "physical
injury" of economic loss caused by commingling of an unapproved-in-
E.U. variety of biotech crops, the StarLink decision, combined with
overseas trade barriers, could create another multi-million dollar
precedent.
A majority of states have some form of the "economic loss doc-
trine" that bars purchasers of goods from asserting negligence claims
104. See, e.g., News Release, Iowa Department of Justice & Attorney General Tom
Miller, Miller: Aventis Signs Formal Agreement to Mitigate Losses from StarLink Corn
(Jan. 23, 2001), available at www.state.ia.us/government/ag/StarLink binding-agt
rel.htm (quoting Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller as saying that it was "irresponsi-
ble" for Aventis to market the StarLink seed corn with unrealistic restrictions, such as
660-foot "buffer strips" between StarLink and other planted corn and segregating
StarLink grain from other corn, and saying that his office believes most growers were
not aware of the restrictions).
105. See In re StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
106. See id.
107. See Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Settlement Class for Certification, Pro-
posed Settlement and Fairness Hearing, Starlink Corn Prods. Liability Litigation,




with damages for economic losses. 108 Economic loss in some states is
defined as constituting qualitative defects in the goods themselves
(e.g., where there is no claim of personal injury or property damage
other than a qualitative defect in the goods at issue). The StarLink
court applied Illinois law' 09 to hold that a "physical injury" to property
occurred when StarLink commingled with other corn bound for food
uses or export.
Not every state will be receptive to such claims. For example, nui-
sance law as a tool to recover economic losses in the "stream of com-
merce" was criticized in City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co.110 While
the StarLink decision is a novel extension of nuisance doctrine, this
extension was not entirely unpredictable. Various courts preceding
the StarLink decision struggled to define the boundaries of nuisance
law when products cause environmental harm."
Lawyers representing Aventis l12 and other biotech companies
have called this "public nuisance" claim unprecedented because it
sought compensation for interference with corn markets, including
export markets that refused all United States corn due to the pre-
sumed commingling of StarLink corn (and other "unapproved" vari-
eties of biotech corn).11 3 Legal commentators have analyzed the
108. See, e.g., Thomas P. Redick, Symposium: Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies for
Improving Global Consumer Confidence, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 5 (2003).
109. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 448-49 (Ill.
1982) (finding that the economic loss doctrine applies to the sale of inferior or defec-
tive goods and that cases without accompanying personal injury or property damage
are more appropriately handled by existing warranty laws).
110. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 876, 883 (1994) (awarding summary judgment to the defend-
ants, stating that manufacturers of asbestos containing building materials did not cre-
ate nuisance on city property and rejecting the idea that "the stream of commerce can
carry pollutants every bit as effectively as a stream of water" and holding the nuisance
law would "become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort").
111. See, e.g., Arcade Water Dist. v. U.S., 940 F.2d 1265, 1266 (9th Cir. 1991); Selma
Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding a chemical vendor liable for failure to warn of proper disposal);
Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 195 Cal. Rptr. 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Cf Town of Hooksett
Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace Co., 617 F. Supp. 126 (D. N.H. 1984); County of Johnson v.
U.S. Gypsum, 580 F. Supp. 284, 294 (D. Tenn. 1984) (stating that plaintiffs cannot
"convert almost every product liability action into a nuisance claim").
112. Aventis is an E.U.-based pharmaceutical company with a strong presence in the
United States. Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Aventis in the United States: At a Glance, at
http://www.aventis-us.com/newsroom/presskit/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
113. Andrew Harris, Danger Uncertain, But Suits Multiply, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 9, 2002
(stating that Aventis attorney Sheila Birnbaum thinks that "suits are not based on
personal injuries, but instead on 'very novel tort theories"' and quoting her as saying,
"It's our tort system running wild again"); Rachel G. Lattimore & Raquel Whiting,
Genetically Enhanced Seed Suits Not Rooted in Law or Logic, WASH. LEGAL FoUND. LEGAL
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StarLink precedent in some detail, however, and in context it appears
to represent a logical progression from past cases. 114
StarLink established a precedent for agricultural biotechnol-
ogy, 115 but its legal impact may be minimized in future actions. Other
plaintiffs have tried and failed to make a case for damages arising
from other varieties of biotech crops that lack overseas approval. In
Sample v. Monsanto Co., 1 16 farmer plaintiffs tacked public nuisance and
negligence theories onto an antitrust action against Monsanto for GM
corn and soybean seeds that caused a nationwide decline in corn
prices (i.e., economic loss). Plaintiffs claimed that Monsanto failed to
take the appropriate measures to prevent the GM corn from entering
the "chain of grain marketing"1 17 and that, as a result, the plaintiffs
lost significant domestic and foreign commodity corn markets.
The court held that plaintiffs had abandoned or failed to prove
the physical injury allegations that survived a motion to dismiss'1 8
(i.e., actual commingling via pollen drift). The court also held that it
could not apply state law other than Illinois and Iowa (where each of
the two class plaintiffs resided) even though a "potential unnamed
class member might live in a state where nuisance claims are actiona-
BACKGROUNDER, July 27, 2001, available at www.arentfox.com/legal-updates/con-
tent592.htm.
114. See, e.g., Margaret Rosso Grossman, Genetically Modified Crops in the United States:
Federal Regulation and State Tort Liability, 5 ENVrL. L. REV. 86, 93 (2003) (stating that ex
post liability allocates fault to those who cause harm that ex ante regulation fails to
prevent).
115. Amelia P. Nelson, Legal Liability in the Wake of Starlink: Who Pays in the End ?, 7
DRAKE J. AGIic. L. 241 (Spring 2002).
116. 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
117. See id. at 1091 (quoting counsel for the plaintiffs as stating, "The claims of this
tort class are based on commingling, our word 'contamination,' in the U.S. marketing
channel, not where the wind blows in Iowa and where and if it blows over the fence of
a particular farmer's property"). The court then explained the plaintiffs' position
and incorrectly stated the European Union had banned U.S. soybeans, as well as corn:
Counsel explained that the term "contamination" did not refer to physical
injury to the person or property of the plaintiffs, but to the "U.S. marketing
channel." Plaintiffs allege that non-GM farmers lost revenue because the
European community rejected Monsanto's genetically modified products
and boycotted all American corn and soy as a result. Id.
118. Plaintiffs alleged that genetically modified seeds caused environmental
problems, such as "toxicity to soil microorganisms and non-target insects such as but-
terflies" and "contamination caused by cross-pollination and commingling." See id.
Plaintiffs also asked the Court "to enter an injunction requiring Monsanto to control
and/or prevent contamination of non-GM crops, soil and farming, storage and trans-
portation equipment; to implement and monitor an effective Insect Resistance Man-
agement Plan; and to adequately test GM seeds for human health and environmental
safety." Id.
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ble even in the absence of physical injury." 119 As a result, the court
granted summary judgment on claims alleging economic loss from
unapproved-in-E.U. crops, finding that "no evidence of physical injury
to the person or property of the named plaintiffs or any proposed
class member was offered by plaintiffs."' 20
Given the Sample decision, it may be difficult for plaintiffs to
prove actual commingling in the chain of grain marketing sufficient
to establish the "physical injury" contemplated by the StarLink deci-
sion. 121 However, while a nuisance is incapable of any exact or precise
definition, 122 nuisance law may be flexible enough to encompass eco-
nomic loss caused by a biotech crop that lacks regulatory approval in a
major overseas market.
B. Warranty Liability and Industry Stewardship
The United States' life sciences industry should contain the Star-
Link precedent to its unique fact pattern by avoiding the creation of
new "bad facts" that might reinforce the StarLink decision allowing
compensatory damages. Unfortunately, the current use of form con-
tracts that shift risk to growers and impose warranty disclaimers could
lead to increased risk under the StarLink precedent, while doing little
to prevent the allocation of liability to a negligent biotech company
that fails to warn of the potentially cataclysmic economic risks of
commingling.
For example, Monsanto asks its growers to sign a Stewardship
Agreement with them that contains requirements and procedures that
growers must agree to follow.1 23 The seed company liability disclaim-
ers appear in various places in the agreement, including: (1) the fine
print of Stewardship Agreements, (2) the separate guide for farmer
practices delivered with the seed, and (3) the logo on the bag. Ac-
119. Sample, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 n.1.
120. Id. at 1091.
121. Monsanto used its controversial forum selection clause to get venue in its
home district, the Eastern District of Missouri. Monsanto succeeded in having claims
for negligence and nuisance dismissed because the farmers did not allege facts sup-
porting actual commingling of their grain with Monsanto's unapproved-in-E.U. vari-
ety of corn. Id.
122. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 616-17
(5th ed. 1984) (stating that "[f]ew terms have afforded so excellent an illustration of
the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catchword as a substitute for any
analysis of the problem; the defendant's interference with the plaintiffs interests is
characterized as a 'nuisance,' and there is nothing more to be said").
123. See, e.g., 2005 Monsanto Technology Stewardship Agreement, in David R. Moel-
ler and Michael Sligh, Farmers' Guide to GMOs, available at http://www.nationalag
lawcenter.org/assets/articles/moeller-gmos.pdf.
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cording to the Stewardship Agreement, the grower is bound to as-
sume the risk of liability and agrees not to save seed upon ripping
open the bag. Such a "bag rip" agreement would ostensibly bind
growers in a fashion similar to "click-wrap" website contracts or
"Shrink-Wrap" software licenses, 124 but this novel theory of contract
law remains untested in the context of stewardship agreements.
According to the Stewardship Agreement, growers are bound to
"channel grain produced to appropriate markets as necessary to pre-
vent movement to markets when the grain has not yet received regula-
tory approval for import." Under a separate section entitled "You
Understand," the channeling obligation is clarified by stating that not
all of Monsanto's products have been approved in certain export mar-
kets and, as a result, crops generated with the aid of those products
must be segregated. This document requires growers to confine bi-
otech crops to approved uses and markets. Such efforts should help
appease European fears concerning the co-mingling of approved and
non-approved GM crops and other products.
While Monsanto provides extensive disclosures, if it were to fail to
inform growers of the risk that they run by commingling their unap-
proved variety with a neighbor's crop then the combined effect of this
uniform non-disclosure, paired with a form contract common to all
growers, could create the "commonality" required to certify a nation-
wide class action. And if the "physical injury" of commingling is al-
leged by the neighbor (whose crop is no longer fit for its intended
purposes), then a compensation claim for a decline in grain prices
could be recoverable. While it is not possible to predict Monsanto's
future legal policies and positions with certainty, Monsanto appears to
have plans to market unapproved-overseas soybeans and corn in the
coming era of traceability. 125 Monsanto may need to change the ap-
proach it takes to protect itself from claims by growers for the biotech
soybean, which could be commercially launched in the next few years,
124. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1239, 1241 (1995) (explaining that shrinkwrap licensing agreements are de-
signed to bind the customers who use the product by the terms of the vendor in
exchange for use).
125. Monsanto has also withdrawn Roundup Ready Wheat, which is a variety of bi-
otech crop that lacks E.U. approval and carries commingling risks comparable to self-
pollinating soybeans. Press Release, Monsanto Company, Monsanto to Realign Re-
search Portfolio, Development of Roundup Ready Wheat Deferred (May 10, 2004),
available at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/04/05-10-04.asp.
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and threaten several billion dollars per year in annual soybean exports
to the E.U.
126
C. Grower Insurance for Biotech Crops
Given StarLink's massive liability, which included nearly all eco-
nomic loss without any proven human injury, the insurance industry is
writing this risk of economic loss from biotech crops out of policies. 127
Insurers now demand premiums for specific GMO endorsements, just
as they have done with other novel environmental liabilities. Many
carriers are now writing "GMO exclusions" applicable in farm insur-
ance, grain shipping, and other industry sectors.
In early 2000, a major Swiss insurer issued a report stating that it
would be hesitant to provide insurance for the liability risks arising
from biotech crops.' 28 This re-insurance company, Swiss Re,129 was
widely reported as taking the position that insurers had inadequate
data available on the relevant loss scenarios. 130 Swiss Re and other
insurers expect that biotech crop risks will become more calculable
over time, as data is accumulated, and will eventually become easier to
fit into traditional insurance models. 131 Swiss Re was quoted as stat-
ing: "today we must assume that the one-sided acceptance of incalcu-
lable risks means that any participants in this insurance market run





Thus growers concerned about being left uninsured for the risks
of commingling (which are increasingly being shifted contractually to
the grower) should carefully review their farm liability policies with
their agent and/or legal counsel. If a policy contains an exclusion for
particular liability risks of biotech crops, the grower should determine
126. See MONSANTO COMPANY, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT: SETTING THE STANDARD IN THE
FIELD 7 (2004), available at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/content/media/
pubs/2004/2004_annualreport.pdf (explaining Monsanto's hopes to launch a new
soybean in 2005).
127. See generally Mayerson, supra note 44.
128. See Tom Lowe, Insuring the GM Industry, THE JACKSON PROGRESSIVE, May 25,
2000, at www.jacksonprogressive.com/issues/foodtech/insuringgm052500.html (last
visited Apr. 27, 2005).
129. Swiss Re is one of the largest insurers in the world. See Need to Know, TIMES
(London), Feb. 15, 2005, at 38.
130. See id.
131. See generally Mayerson, supra note 44.
132. Peter Montague, If You're Not Concerned About GM Foods You Will Be After You
Read This: What the National Academy of Science Says About Genetically Engineered Crops,
TOM PAINE, COMMON SENSE, May 19, 2000, at http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.
cfm/ID/3153 (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
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the range of liability for damages. The covered perils should include
pollen drift from neighboring farms growing an unapproved-in-E.U.
genetic event, commingling at harvest through shared combines, or
commingling through post-harvest mixing in transports, grain eleva-
tors, and so on through the chain of commerce.
Given the retreat of insurers from the risks posed by unapproved-
in-E.U. varieties, biotech companies should fund or support a nation-
wide legal strategy that: (a) manages the class action exposure gener-
ated by these dangerous disclaimers and (b) seeks to prevent "bad
facts" from making bad case law (i.e., prevent large scale commingling
of any unapproved-in-European biotech variety) as they have done
with other foreseeable billion dollar liability risks. Some form ofjoint
self-insurance and risk management could also be considered as an
option for this shared risk.
D. Grower's Response to Traceability Risks
It is obvious that the E.U.'s various tracing-related directives will
change United States grain handling into a more document-intensive
process. Producers may have to provide proof to buyers that they have
maintained records of the varieties of biotech events. Cautious grow-
ers have already begun saving receipts and documenting use of partic-
ular seeds in order to be prepared to show that they did not grow a
variety barred from entry into the E.U.
At a minimum, E.U. traceability will probably increase costs of
U.S. production by forcing a transformation of markets via contrac-
tual requirements that impose a higher level of "process standard"
upon agricultural production. The difficulty of complying with the
E.U. T&L Directives has been the subject of studies commissioned by
the feed industry. 133
The sale in the United States of a biotech crop that cannot be
exported to the E.U. represents an economic threat to crops bound
for export. The economic risks of these crops are largely left to the
states to manage, via various methodologies.13 4 These crops cannot
reach their intended market if the unapproved biotech crop mixes
with it in the field, through pollen drift, a "volunteer" emerging from
133. See, e.g., Tim Herrman, White Paper on Traceability in the U.S. Grain and Plant
Protein Feed Ingredient Industries, July 2, 2002, available at http://www.oznet.ksu.edu/
grsiext/white%20paper%20CVM.pdf (explaining the results of a Kansas State Univer-
sity study commissioned by the American Feed Industry Association).
134. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE AND FEDERAL




grain left on the ground in a prior harvest, or through post-harvest
commingling.135
1. Organic Growers
Organic growers may agree to "zero tolerance" for biotech crops
in their harvest in an effort to meet the E.U.'s "zero tolerance" stan-
dard for unapproved varieties in food or feed. Given the problems of
commingling from various steps in production, such growers are likely
to incur problems in delivering the goods promised. 136 Farmers are
increasingly asked to certify that their crop is non-GM or is free from
unapproved-in-E.U. varieties when there are no assurances that seed
sold to them was pure (i.e., free from unwanted genetic events). 1
3 7
However, contracts to deliver grain to demanding grain buyers
who expect growers to meet this strict "zero tolerance" standard may
fail to be enforced in certain courts, due to the commercial "impossi-
bility" or "impracticability" of both a grower and a seed company
achieving "zero tolerance" for unapproved-in-E.U. genetic events in
today's marketplace. 138 If the grower failed to assume a particular risk
(e.g., he stated in his warranty that he could not warrant the purity of
the seed he purchased), then the grain buyer may be assuming the
risk of impure seed containing an unapproved-in-E.U. variety, which
triggers specific economic loss to a customer in Europe.
Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code echoes the com-
mon law impossibility defense, providing a defense to contract en-
forcement where the determination of whether the risk of the given
contingency was so unusual or unforeseen and would have such severe
consequences that performance would give the promisee an advan-
135. See Redick, supra note 108.
136. Erik Stokstad, A Little Pollen Goes a Long Way, 296 Sci. 2314, June 28, 2002,
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/296/5577/2314a.pdf (predict-
ing difficulty in growing "a truly GM-free crop" in the United States and suggesting
"[z]ero tolerance is not going to work").
137. Farmers should state a "pass-through" warranty (i.e., "the seed company repre-
sented the seed was X variety and did not represent it as genetically modified organ-
ism seed"). If the seed company represented it as non-genetically modified seed, the
growers should repeat that warranty. Growers should use care to avoid contamination
in bins, augers, combines, transports, etc., and save all seed invoices for at least five
years.
138. The Uniform Commercial Code provision governing excuse of performance
has rcplaced the common law requirement of impossibility of performance by a less
stringent standard of commercial impracticability. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-
615, cmt. 3 (West 1966); Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748
(Iowa 1976).
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tage that he did not bargain for in making the contract. 13 9 If an or-
ganic grower promises "zero tolerance" in an era when seed purity as
to unapproved biotech events is not guaranteed to zero,140 that
grower could be seen as assuming the risk of impure seed. While
some commentators have suggested neighboring biotech growers
could be liable to organic growers,' 4 ' the balance of authority gener-
ally would not favor an organic grower whose agreement to deliver to
a certain standard imposes upon his land a restriction of his own
choosing, an agreement made after years of allowing pollen to freely
flow across his property.142 Commingling with a trace of increasingly
common biotech crops is arguably foreseeable in today's marketplace.
As a result, organic growers are not likely to succeed in asserting
liability claims from GM contamination if they agree to deliver one
hundred percent non-GM crops (assuming their seed does not carry a
one hundred percent guarantee). If certifying organizations and or-
ganic customers insist on organic crops that contain no "genetically
engineered-contamination" then organic growers will have few reme-
dies other than formation of strictly enforced exclusionary grower
districts.
143
139. See, e.g., Mishara Constr. Co., Inc. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d
363 (Mass. 1974); Comment, Contractual Excuse Based on a Failure of Presupposed Condi-
tions, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 235, 249 (1976) (stating that the test under UCC § 2-615 is
whether an unforeseen, unrecorded contingency was one that the parties could rea-
sonably have foreseen as a real possibility affecting performance, making it a risk that
the parties were "tacitly assigning to the promisor by their failure to provide for it
explicitly"). Compare Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283,
293 (7th Cir. 1974); Center Garment Co. Inc. v. United Refrigerator Co., 3341 N.E.2d
669, 673 (Mass. 1976); Olson v. Spitzer, 257 N.W.2d 459, 463 (S.D. 1977). For older
cases defining and applying a similar common-law test of impossibility of perform-
ance, see Village of Minnesota v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 31 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Minn.
1948); Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 179 N.E. 383, 384 (N.Y.
1932).
140. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Standards Need to Be Developed for Adventi-
tious Presence of Biotech Products, at http://www.bio.org/foodag/background/adventi-
tious.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
141. See A. Bryan Endres, "GMO:" Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary
Obligation? The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European
Union, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 484 (2000).
142. See Drew L. Kershen, Legal Liability Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, NAT'L
AGRic. L. REs. CTR., Nov. 2002, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/as-
sets/articles/kershen-biotech.pdf, reprinted in 10 ENVTL. LIABILITY 203-16 (Dec. 2002)
(discussing general tort theories related to pollen drift and litigation such as Starlink).
143. Cf Edie Lau and Mike Lee, Biotech Ban May Sprout Others: Mendocino County's
Action Rattles Genetic Engineering Industry, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.sacbee.com/static/live/news/projects/biotech/archive/030504.html
(stating that "the 14,839 voters who this week banned genetically modified organisms
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2. Corn Growers "Channeling"
Since about twenty percent of the United States corn harvest is
exported, and only a fraction of that would be bound for the E.U., the
National Corn Growers Association ("NCGA") acknowledges the chal-
lenge of segregating crops and informs growers to "Know Before You
Grow" so that they are aware of post-harvest limitations on market-
ing.144 As we noted above, the lost corn trade to the E.U. since 1997
has been estimated by various sources in the United States and Eu-
rope to exceed, in total, as much as $1.5 billion (at a conservative
estimate of $200 million per year for seven years).145
NCGA warns growers in explicit detail regarding the economic
risks posed by unapproved-in-E.U. varieties, stating:
You should select hybrids with the full knowledge of whether it is
conventional, approved for E.U. export or not yet approved for E.U.
export. Growers should read their grower agreements before plant-
ing and be fully aware of the requirements of those agreements. It
is vital that hybrids awaiting E.U. approval are kept out of export
and processing channels. Growers must also "Know Where to Go"
when they sell their harvest: NCGA urges you to funnel hybrids not
approved for E.U. export into one of three markets. Those markets
are: (1) your own livestock rations, (2) domestic livestock feeding
channels or (3) elevators accepting grain not yet approved for E.U.
export. Visit the American Seed Trade Association web site and
look up information about the grain facilities accepting hybrids not
yet approved for export to the E.U.
146
NCGA has been heavily involved in the controversy over Mexico's
perceived threat from biotech corn. 147 A letter sent to EPA Adminis-
trator Michael Levitt1 48 pointed out that all non-indigenous corn car-
ries some potential for replacing local varieties or commingling its
DNA with related corn or teosinte plants. Among the corn seed in-
dustry, Dupont-Pioneer has long led an industry effort to conserve ge-
in Mendocino County have shaken the establishment far beyond their small North
Coast Community").
144. See National Corn Growers Association, Know Before You Grow, at http://www.
ncga.com/biotechnology/knowwhere (last visited Apr. 27, 2005); see also American
Seed Trade Association, Grain Handlers Database, at http://asta.farmprogress.com
(last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
145. See CNN, EU Defends Biotech Crop Rules, Aug. 18, 2003, available at http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/O8/18/us.europe.gm.ap (stating that "American
farmers estimate the EU restrictions have cost them nearly $300 million a year (267
million euros) in lost corn exports alone.").
146. See Know Before You Grow, at supra note 144.
147. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
148. Letter to Michael Leavitt, supra note 90.
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netic resources in corn around the world, and particularly in
Mexico. 149 The company recently renewed that commitment with a
pledge of $1 million to the Global Crop Diversity Trust, an interna-
tional fund charged with funding genebanks (storage facilities for
plant germplasm) and crop diversity collections around the world. 150
3. Soybean Growers "Identity Preservation"
In late 1997, the American Soybean Association ("ASA") made a
strategic decision to safeguard United States exports of soybeans to
the E.U. To address the role of commingling export soybeans with
unapproved-in-E.U. soybeans, ASA sent a letter to eleven companies
involved in producing seeds for biotech crops. In this letter, ASA
asked each company to refrain from the unrestricted commercial mar-
keting of unapproved-in-E.U. soybeans.
151
In 1998, ASA asked AgrEvo USA to restrict marketing of seed to
United States farmers of the Liberty Link Soybean seed, which lacked
approval in the E.U., to ensure that growers and grain handlers would
keep it out of United States soybean exports. 152 AgrEvo eventually
agreed that its "Liberty Link Stewardship Program" needed improve-
ment to ensure that the Liberty Link Soybean did not commingle with
soybeans bound for export.15 3 AgrEvo first proposed narrowing the
geographical scope of its launch of Liberty Link soybean and eventu-
ally abandoned the product launch altogether.
154
The second test of ASA's policy requiring complete segregation
of unapproved varieties came in 1999 with the launch of Dupont's
149. See, e.g., Press Release, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc., Contributes Funds to SIUE National Corn-to-Ethanol Research
Center (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.pioneer.com/pioneer-news/press-
releases/corporate/siue.htm.
150. Press Release, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., DuPont Announces $1 Mil-
lion Commitment to Global Crop Diversity Trust: Pledge Will Help Sustain Endan-
gered Global Plant Genetic Resources, Biodiversity (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://
www.pioneer.com/pioneer-news/press-releases/corporate/global.htm ("As part of
DuPont's commitment to conserving and promoting biodiversity, the company re-
cently sent a message to seed industry leaders specifically outlining the importance of
and benefits derived from preserving crop genetic diversity.").
151. See Thomas P. Redick, Biopharming, Biosafety, and Billion Dollar Debacles, 8 DRAKE
J. AGRIc. L. 136-37 (2003).
152. See Press Release, American Soybean Assoc., ASA Applauds AgrEvo Effort to
Protect U.S. Soybean Export Markets (Apr. 14, 1998), available at http://www.
soygrowers.com/newsroom/releases/documents/agrevodl.htm.
153. See id.
154. See Redick, supra note 151.
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high-oleic soybean.155 This commercial launch featured strict adher-
ence to the identity preservation plan proposed by ASA (as adapted in
confidential negotiations). As a result of these negotiations, an indus-
try standard for "identity preservation" began to emerge. 156 The
eleven-point plan adopted by ASA/USB/NOPA for ensuring that bi-
otech companies practice sound stewardship for "unapproved-over-
seas" varieties is a useful tool in managing liability risks. 157 Through
the use of crop-specific isolation, machinery and bin cleanout proce-
dures, and third party oversight of every step, ASA has attempted to
establish a system minimizing the likelihood of commingling. To the
extent that biotech companies follow this standard, they will avoid sig-
nificant threats of class action liability and will also assist growers in
meeting contractual obligations to their buyers.
This raises the question of whether all soybean seed production
should be conducted in accordance with most of the technical re-
quirements of ASA's eleven-point plan, to ensure delivery of seed that
is nearly one hundred percent free from unapproved-overseas vari-
eties of biotech soybeans. At present, the warranty of purity provided
for seed is not within the low levels mandated by the E.U. The Ameri-
can Seed Trade Association has shown a willingness to adapt to cus-
tomer needs but is concerned about the high cost of meeting "zero
tolerance" in seed.' 58 Industry websites explain the difficulties inher-
ent in assuring one hundred percent genetic purity of seed. 15 9
Seed company liability disclaimers that shift the risk of commin-
gling to the grower without an adequate disclosure of the risks of com-
mingling and the methodology for preventing it, may encounter
judges that are unwilling to enforce the disclaimer.' 60 These clauses,
155. See, e.g., J.L. Glancey et al., Development of High Oleic Soybean Oil-Seed Hydrolic
Fluid, FEEDSTOCKS, Mar. 1999, at 1.
156. See, e.g., Presentation by Stephen Censky, ASA President, Improving Communi-
cation from Seed Production Through Retail, available at http://www.soygrowers.
com/newsroom/releases/documents/aba-rtp2.html (predicting a "cataclysm of lost
export trade with the European Union" if identity preservation methods were not
carefully implemented; this prediction was made in 1999, the year it was revealed that
StarLink corn had been used for unapproved purposes).
157. See infra note 185.
158. See News Release, American Seed Trade Association, A Seed Industry Response
to Issues Raised By the Presence of Biotech Seed in Conventional Seed Lots (July 8,
2004), available at http://www.amseed.com/newsDetail.asp?id=95.
159. See, e.g., DuPont, Gene Flow Via Pollination and Crops Derived Through Biotechnol-
ogy, at http://www.dupont.com/biotech/scienceknowledge/geneflow/scientific-
narrative.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
160. See generally J.W. Looney, Warranties in Livestock, Feed, Seed, and Pesticide Transac-
tions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1123 (1995).
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along with forum selection in the seed company's home jurisdiction,
are often challenged as unconscionable contracts of adhesion.1 6 ' De-
spite this, many companies in the industry continue to make use of
these disclaimers, accompanied by detailed stewardship programs.
1 62
4. Rice Growers' Legislative Approach
To date California has protected its commodity export markets
from the sale of biotech varieties that lack overseas approval. The Cal-
ifornia legislature took steps to control the marketing of new varieties
of unapproved rice, in part to protect export markets from the im-
pacts of commingling. California has a long history of legislative man-
agement of agriculture, including the establishment of zones for
certain varieties of cotton, rice, or other commercially important
crops requiring genetic purity to meet market demands. These zones
limit the opportunity for pollen to cause an economic nuisance mov-
ing across boundary lines. Agricultural Districts have various powers
defined by statute,1 63 including the abatement of public nuisances or
other specific threats that come to the attention of the legislature.
1 6 4
The public entity responsible takes all measures necessary to abate a
living threat to agriculture. Once abated, the entity often has a lien
for the costs of doing so on the affected owner.
165
However, the advisory commission on rice, which is made up in
part of California Rice Commission members, recently recommended
growing Ventria's 16 6 field trial of rice with a plant-made pharmaceuti-
cal ("PMP") to the California Secretary for the Department of Food
and Agriculture. 167 The California Department of Food and Agricul-
161. See, e.g., Monsanto v. Homan McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Clevenger, J. dissenting) (chastising the court's upholding of the Monsanto forum
selection clause by stating, "My colleagues have the honor of making this court the
first to enforce a forum selection clause in a contract of adhesion against a defendant
in derogation of his constitutional rights").
162. See generally id. at note 29. The Monsanto program for grower stewardship in-
cludes instructions on "channeling" requirements, and solicits contact information
from the grower to allow notifications to go to them regarding "regulatory status" and
other issues. See id.
163. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD AND AGRic. CODE §§ 59081-59088 (2004).
164. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 59081 (2004).
165. CAL. FOOD AND AGRIC. CODE §§ 5401, 5462, 5428, 5430, 7305 (2004).
166. Ventria is a U.S.-based biotech company that focuses its efforts on products in
the biopharmaceutical and nutrition fields. SeeVentria Bioscience, About Us, at http:/
/www.ventria.com/aboutus (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
167. Paul Elias, Biotech Firm Wants to Grow Rice for Medicinal Supplements, USA




ture expressed a need for public hearings. Ventria has reacted, how-
ever, by committing to moving the majority of its operations to
Maryville, Missouri, where it hopes to find a more welcoming environ-
ment than California.1 68 After Riceland Foods and Anheuser Busch
questioned the wisdom of growing this rice near the Southeast
boarder of Missouri, which is close to the Arkansas-Missouri $100-mil-
lion rice market, Ventria agreed to stay at least 120 miles from that
rice-growing region.169
5. Wheat Growers
The Executive Board of the National Association of Wheat Grow-
ers ("NAWG") approved a biotechnology Principles of Commercializa-
tion setting out a roadmap for commercializing biotechnology traits
in wheat. This was prepared by the joint Biotechnology Committee of
NAWG, U.S. Wheat Associates, and the Wheat Export Trade Educa-
tion Committee ("WETEC").
17 °
The Principles of Commercialization state that United States
wheat producers recognize the benefits of biotech wheat chain and
generally support commercialization of transgenic wheat trait, pro-
vided that there is a commercialization plan that "facilitates commer-
cialization with minimal market disruption," and allows customers to
make purchases based on their preferences for specific traits, classes,
qualities, and characteristics.1 71 Wheat growers will vigorously oppose
commercialization of transgenic wheat traits that do not meet all of
the aforementioned principles. While the WETEC board approved
this draft plan in October 2004, the U.S. Wheat Associates Board
("USWAB") rejected the draft plan in October 2004 in a closed execu-
tive session. According to NAWG's report of that decision, no alterna-
tive plan was proposed by USWAB, and no direction was given to the
Biotechnology Committee for amendments. The action leaves the
168. See University Draws California Biotech Firm to Mayville, COLUMBIA DAILY TRm.
(Columbia, MO), Nov. 21, 2004, (stating that Ventria will move to Maryville, home to
Northwest Missouri State University, where a new building will be constructed using
$5 million from anonymous donors for it and other emerging biotech companies to
use), available at http://www.showmenews.com/2004/Nov/20041121News02l.asp.
169. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Ventria Strike Deal on Rice, COLUMBIA DAILY TRm. (Co-
lumbia, Mo.), Apr. 16, 2005, available at http://www.showmenews.com/2005/Apr/
20050416News016.asp.
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wheat industry without a coordinated plan to move forward on this
critical issue of acceptance of biotech crops. 172
E. The Biosafety Body Count
Historically, trade agreements and the WTO have been accused
of promoting environmental degradation, forcing nations to compete
for commercial success at the expense of the environment, and rush-
ing toward a "lowest common denominator" of minimal environmen-
tal protection. 173 With the advent of biotech crops, however, there is
a role reversal underway. The WTO can enhance environmental pro-
tection by reigning in the E.U. and its member states' mistaken mora-
torium on biotech crops, reversing the trend toward worldwide
rejection of biotech crops that provide the best available control tech-
nology for managing significant threats to ecological and human
health.
While the "precautionary approach" mandating increased regula-
tory scrutiny and traceability of biotech crops is based upon fears of
future harm, it appears to be a system that could lead to unintended
consequences including loss of human lives. It could be argued that
the E.U. system of traceability has already led to adverse effects upon
the health of consumers in both the E.U. member nations and nations
who hope to export to the E.U.
In the E.U. food manufacturers are so wary of triggering con-
sumer fears about traces of GMOs that they will suspend the sale of
products that are below the one percent GM label threshold, but nev-
ertheless test positive for traces of GM content. On April 12, 2001,
Italian authorities seized and tested a sample of soy-based biscuits
made by Plada, an Italian subsidiary of H.J. Heinz, the multinational
United States-based food company. While tests showed GM levels
were well under one percent (0.08 percent), Heinz recalled the bis-
cuits, asserting that it used only conventional, non-GM ingredients.
174
This was unfortunate for many consumers, because the Heinz biscuits
172. Press Release, National Association of Wheat Growers, Biotech Action Plan
Falls One Step Short (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.wheatworld.org/html/
news.cfm?ID=667.
173. See, e.g., Donella Meadows, Free Trade Can Work Against the Environment-Or For
It, available at http://www.sustainer.org/dhm-archive/search.php?display-article=
VN506nafta-iied.




were one of the very few baked goods products which sufferers of Ce-
liac disease 175 are allowed to consume.
As noted earlier in this article, President Bush has accused the
E.U. of hindering the fight against famine in Africa.176 During a
drought in 2002, the United States attempted to alleviate some of the
suffering by offering food aid, but their offer was rejected by Zambia
based upon fears that seeds of GMO-containing foods might intermin-
gle with the domestic agricultural systems, rendering their exports in-
eligible for entry into the E.U. 177 The Zambian government initially
accepted GM foods when offered by the United States.178 Zambian
Vice President Enoch Kavindele said, "if Americans can eat GM, Zam-
bians should be able to eat GM." Two months later, however, Presi-
dent Levy Mwanawasa declared the food "poisonous" and ordered
that it be shipped to neighboring Malawi, which possessed no GM re-
strictions.' 79 The Zambians claimed that public concern prompted
the change, but Time magazine learned through a senior government
official that at least two diplomats from European countries "leaned
on the Zambians in private discussions" in order to affect their deci-
sion.180 This issue remains relevant today, as the world press recently
criticized the United States for placing "relentless pressure" on Sudan
and Angola to accept gene-altered food aid.181
If the E.U.'s T&L Directives continue to dominate world trade,
driving its trading partners to reject all biotech crops lacking E.U. ap-
proval, this global rejection will have measurable adverse effects in the
form of health effects from mycotoxins and environmental effects of
soil run-off. These adverse consequences will be measured in floating
fish and loss of habitat for endangered species, leading to nutrition-
ally distressed children, lost species, and lost lives. In an ironic twist,
the E.U.'s effort to avoid having biotech food "forced down its throat"
could lead to the force-feeding of mycotoxins or pesticides in nations
175. Due to their genetics, Europeans have a relatively high rate of Celiac disease.
See id.; see also Celiac Disease Foundation, Celiac Disease, at www.celiac.org/cd-main.
html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005) (explaining that celiac disease is a life long digestive
disorder that interferes with the digestion of nutrients and can also cause damage to
muscle tissue and the small intestine).
176. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
177. Pew Initiative, supra note 36.
178. See Simon Robinson, To Eat or Not to Eat, TIME ONLINE EDITION, Nov. 24, 2002,
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lacking the risk management tools to detect and remove such con-
taminants. Over time, direct loss of life and species that is attributable
to E.U. biotech policy could be tracked using a "biosafety body count"
that links deaths to various adverse effects of this tampering with the
global food supply. As the "biosafety body count" rises, the world will
slowly be forced to come to grips with the benefits that biotech crops
now on the market could have offered earlier, if they had been widely
accepted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The agricultural biotechnology industry in the United States will
only have a thriving future if the entire agbiotech industry implements
adequate measures for "containment" of biotech crops that are not
approved for export. To maintain the flow of commodities to export
markets, biotech companies can work closely with growers associations
armed with crop-specific "standards of care" that the E.U. could
accept.
A heightened level of industry-wide stewardship could be estab-
lished immediately with a standard stewardship clause incorporated
into signed agreements with growers. The contracts could be en-
forced by the threat of contractually stipulated injunctive relief against
those who fail to comply with stewardship standards. This industry-
wide mandatory stewardship program would simultaneously stem a
looming tide of frivolous nuisance cases and also isolate the public
nuisance precedent established in the StarLink case182 by preventing
another set of bad facts from reaching appellate courts and making
bad law for biotech companies.
A coordinated strategy between growers and biotech companies
is needed to prevent both economically cataclysmic impacts to inter-
national trade and devastating legal precedents that could cede some
control over the biotech industry's future to plaintiff's class action at-
torneys. 1 3 StarLink left both of these economic and legal impacts be-
hind, and it also left grounds that would be used to support a credible
threat of "anticipatory nuisance" that can be used to impose strict con-
tainment on biotech crops where necessary.
Public nuisance law could be used by responsible biotech compa-
nies, growers, grain companies, or grocers who want to impose a
higher level of stewardship for a particular biotech crop. If the chain
182. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
183. The history of litigation and legislation is worth reviewing as an example of




of commerce in a particular crop is threatened by potential commin-
gling, StarLink's public nuisance precedent could be used to enjoin
that which federal regulators may lack the resources or authority to
oversee properly.
The economic threat posed by biotech crops to the marketplace
is vastly outweighed by the threat to the agricultural biotechnology
industry from such a novel legal development. In other words, the
economic impact upon the United States economy from the loss of
future innovations in agricultural biotechnology is a cataclysm well
worth avoiding, through careful legal planning and cooperation.
APPENDIX A
GROWER CHECKLIST FOR LIABILITY FROM ZERO TOLERANCE STANDARDS
FOR BIOTECH CROPS IN THE AGE OF TRAcEABILITY
1 8 4
The E.U. instituted a new program at the end of April 2004, of
"Traceability and Labeling" that increases the risk of having ship-
ments of grain from the United States turned away from E.U. ports.
This is particularly true for non-GMO shipments of corn and soy-
beans. Shipments will have to disclose the types of biotech crops pre-
sent in a particular shipment, to a tolerance of zero (the limits of
detection) for certain varieties of biotech crops. It is possible that sim-
ilar "zero tolerance" standards could proliferate among E.U. trading
partners that are concerned about losing export trade to the E.U. in
the next few years as parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
implement their own tracing system.
Identity preservation to a zero tolerance has been implemented
successfully by the American Soybean Association for several years
running, as it coped with E.U. "zero tolerance" for various new unap-
proved-in-E.U. varieties of biotech soybeans. ASA's has developed an
eleven-point plan that has succeeded in avoiding liability for growers
and grain shippers, despite E.U. policies imposing zero tolerance for
unapproved-in-E.U. varieties.1 8 5 Growers should keep the following
thoughts in mind:
184. The authors adopted this checklist from information that was originally
provided by the Minnesota Crop Improvement Association.
185. See American Soybean Association, Minimum Requirements for Attempted Identity-
Preserved Production, Harvesting, and Utilization of Biotechnology-Enhanced Varieties/Hybrids
That Are Unapproved for Export to Major Markets, at http://www.soygrowers.com/
publications/minrequire-IP.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
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1. Know What You Are Growing-Including Foreign Material
Seed sales are not certified to a zero tolerance, but can contain
several percentage points of seed that look the same but contain dif-
ferent genetics. If the seed company cannot provide information
about the presence of "unapproved-in-E.U. varieties" in your seed,
seek some assurances from your grower trade association about the
commercial launch of the unapproved-in-E.U. variety.
2. Know What Your Neighbors Plan to Grow
Your neighbors may have decided to plant an unapproved-in-E.U.
variety, or they may have planted seed containing some traces of that
unapproved-in-E.U. variety. While the ideal situation is to have a
neighbor who is as alert as you are, and also communicates with the
seed company and grower association to rule out the possible pres-
ence of an unapproved-in-E.U. variety in his seed, you should take
steps to document your efforts to investigate that neighbor's use of
unapproved-in-E.U. seed. When harvest time comes, it may be too
late to make decisions about sharing combines, transports or elevator
facilities with a grower who is not as careful as you.
3. Read What You Sign, Ask Questions, Take Notes
Your seed salesman may ask you to sign a growers agreement for
unapproved-in-E.U. seeds. Read it carefully, ask questions, and note
the responses. Also, even growers avoiding unapproved-in-E.U. seed
may still be at risk from a neighbor's crops. In that case, the growers
should ask neighbors about the level of stewardship being imple-
mented and suggest ways to avoid commingling of crops before
delivery.
4. Do Not Sign Anything Related to Certain Potential Genetic
Events
You should not sign any affidavit or statement certifying the ab-
sence of a particular genetic event, unless you are certain it is not
being commercially marketed. This is recommended even if you
know your production was in fact from a "non-GMO" seed source.
The current grain distribution system, from your local elevator to the
accumulation of product in a shipping container, may not be ade-
quate to segregate your grain from other unknown sources. Your
grain may in fact have been "non-GMO," however the probability that
it will be commingled during shipment with other grain that may not
be "non-GMO" is high. Commingled shipments will be tested when
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they arrive at their final destination. If any GM grain (e.g., Roundup-
Ready soybeans) is present in the shipment, there is a high probability
it will be detected. This could result in the entire shipment being re-
jected. You need to discuss with your legal counsel the degree of lia-
bility you have for this shipment as a result of certifying your portion
of the shipment's "non-GMO" status by signing an affidavit.
5. Check For the Following
Several quick litmus tests have become available to local elevators
that claim to be able to detect the presence of GM grain. Grain pro-
ducers need to realize that the sampling and testing phase of non-
GMO export transactions is extremely critical and it is very important
for you to:
a. Discuss with someone knowledgeable what adequate proce-
dures for sampling of your shipments need to be followed for
the trait testing to be valid.
b. Demand from those receiving your grain written confirmation
that the entire shipment will be scientifically sampled and
tested at each stage of the entire shipping process.
c. Do not depend on quick and easy testing procedures to verify
the presence of GM grain. The laboratory tests required to relia-
bly test for the presence of GM traits are more complicated,
time consuming and expensive than the quick tests. Contact
your grower association to develop an official non-GMO grain
certification program to assure your next year's production can
enter this segment of the grain market with minimum risks to
the grain producer.
APPENDIX B
AMERICAN SOYBEAN ASSOCIATION POLICY
As a part of the Policy Resolution on Biotechnology Approvals,
the American Soybean Association has generated a document entitled
"Minimum Requirements for Attempted Identity-Preserved Produc-
tion, Harvesting, and Utilization of Biotechnology-Enhanced Soybean
Varieties that are Unapproved for Export to Major Markets." 18 6 As the
name implies, the purpose of the document is to provide growers with
a standardized set of procedures that would help to prevent the co-
mingling of authorized and unauthorized varieties of soybean. Some
of the guidelines contained therein are as follows:
186. Document provided by Kim Nill, Technical Issues Director, International Mar-
keting for the American Soybean Association.
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There must be a contract between the seed company and each
farmer, requiring delivery of all production from the biotechnology-
derived seed, allowing on-farm midseason field inspections, requir-
ing minimum isolation distances from other types of the crop, and
other requirements inherent in certified seed production.
All unused seed must be returned to the seed company for proper
disposal.
Designated delivery points must be facilities that do not deliver any
crop into export channels.
The contract growing of biotechnology-enhanced varieties that are
unapproved for export should be confined to restricted "closed-
loop" geographic areas, and the number of the separate geographic
areas kept to as few as possible, in order to minimize the likelihood
for IP system failures.
Varietal verification testing of each load delivered by each farmer
must be performed at each delivery point, with totals by farmer
matched up with the midseason field yield estimates to ensure that
each farmer delivered all of the biotechnology-enhanced crop he
produces in each crop year.
Before handling or harvesting any other varieties of crops, each
farmer must thoroughly clean out all [equipment] utilized in [han-
dling] the biotechnology-enhanced crops.
No "test plots" of unapproved for export, biotechnology-derived va-
rieties shall be allowed, other than the above contracted fields.
An outside third party will check verification of the establishment of
a closed loop system and adherence to these requirements.
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